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NOTE

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2488th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 26 October 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan)

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2488)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 12 noon.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);

(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);

(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Aidara (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with decisions taken at the 2481st to 2486th meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Kulawiec (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Marín Bosch (Mexico), Mr. Dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Hungary, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Peru and the Sudan in which

they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Somogyi (Hungary), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Arias Stella (Peru) and Mr. Abdalla (Sudan) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The first speaker is the representative of Mexico. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

7. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We thank the members of the Council for giving us this opportunity to participate once again in its consideration of the item on the situation in Namibia.

8. The permanency of the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by the racist régime of Pretoria is one of the issues of greatest concern to the countries of the third world, which are the very countries that feel most keenly the ominous consequences of the tension in southern Africa.

9. There has been considerable progress towards Namibian independence, both in developing and agreeing on modalities for its attainment and in identifying the artificial obstacles that have been placed in its way. In the further report on this matter submitted by the Secretary-General [*S/15943*], he stated that we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978). None the less, he also asserted that South Africa's demand that the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be a pre-condition of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) has made it impossible to launch the United Nations plan for the exercise of self-determination by the Namibian people.

10. The contradiction between the completion of negotiations in accordance with a Security Council resolution and the creation of new prerequisites for its implementation must be declared intolerable by the Members of the Organization, otherwise decisions of a binding nature will be doomed in advance to failure and doubts will be cast on the effectiveness of the Council in fulfilling its obligations, even in cases where positions are in accord.

11. Resolutions unanimously adopted, which also have the consent of the parties directly concerned and the explicit support of the international community, cannot be called into question or subordinated in an artificial way to questions that are extraneous to their substance.

12. If new demands are acceded to or attempts made to change the very essence of the problem, countries are led to question the work of the United Nations and the commitment and sincerity of States with regard to their own decisions. It is a source of particular concern that Members that have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security go back on their commitments.

13. There is a climate of tension in southern Africa created by the convergence of intervention, destabilization and interference, which are now also taking place in other regions of the third world.

14. The South African régime has occupied, in addition to Namibia, part of the territories of other independent countries in the region. It has invoked alleged security reasons for its actions, contending that security can be achieved through violating the integrity and sovereignty of those States with which it has ideological differences and which refuse to co-operate in the maintenance of *apartheid*.

15. Pretoria encourages and supports dissident elements in neighbouring countries and uses them to carry out destabilizing actions of sabotage and terrorism, with the intention of negotiating with the Governments concerned the suppression of movements that run counter to the South African racist policy.

16. The international community must condemn and reject new forms of interference and intervention in order to prevent them from proliferating and spreading to other regions of the third world. South Africa and its allies have imposed conditions throughout the negotiations that have been accepted by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the front-line States. However, flexibility has been interpreted as weakness, and a readiness to negotiate as a basis for additional demands.

17. The independence of Namibia is a matter of priority for the vast majority of Member States of the United Nations. Negotiations to achieve it have been long, difficult and painstaking and have required a prudent and flexible policy on the part of the people of Namibia, guided by SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative. That process now seems on the verge of conclusion. It is therefore essential that we reject the imposition of new conditions, conditions that are totally extraneous to resolution 435 (1978).

18. The Council must be very clear in respect of South Africa. It must unfailingly emphasize that it cannot accept a linkage of the independence of Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, whose purposes and objectives are matters pertaining to the internal sovereignty of the countries concerned. Furthermore, Pretoria must understand that the independence of Namibia has to be obtained in the short term and that if it continues its obstruction it will be subject to mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

19. In conclusion, we appeal to the Council to act accordingly.

20. Mr. NATORF (Poland): Sir, I should like first of all to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of

October. We are firmly convinced that your able guidance, coupled with your diplomatic skill and experience, will contribute to the discharge of the responsible duties that have been vested in the Council.

21. At the same time, let me also express our appreciation and thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, for his wisdom and for the most efficient and exemplary manner in which he conducted the Council's business in the month of September.

22. The present debate confirms once again that, although 16 years have elapsed since South Africa's Mandate over Namibia was terminated, we are facing the same serious problems today and the Pretoria régime still continues its illegal occupation of the Territory, violates United Nations decisions and systematically opposes all proposals for a peaceful settlement, thus taxing the patience of the whole of Africa, of the world community and of the United Nations.

23. Five years after the adoption by the Council of resolution 435 (1978), Namibia continues to remain under a colonial yoke, the United Nations plan remains unimplemented, and peace, freedom and independence for that Territory are still goals of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the non-aligned States and all progressive opinion in the world.

24. We have listened to many speakers in this debate. The overwhelming majority of them have unequivocally pointed out that the delaying tactics of the *apartheid* régime and its Western supporters have only one purpose, that of creating conditions for the continued control of the Territory by South Africa. The so-called contact group has in fact only gained time for Pretoria to strengthen its hold over Namibia. It has permitted the further exploitation of the resources of the Territory, as the *apartheid* rulers and their protectors have not abandoned their ambitions of keeping Namibia, either as a colony or as a neo-colony.

25. Therefore it is the urgent duty of the Council to adopt effective measures. The United Nations must—and I hope it will—act. That is the purpose of these meetings—to examine the most important and urgent steps to ensure independence for Namibia so that the people of the Territory can exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and freedom. The Council should clearly reiterate its responsibility. We should not disappoint world opinion and dash the hopes and expectations of the Namibian people.

26. The responsibility of the Council is to make every effort towards the achievement of this goal in the shortest possible time. The Council must translate its will to implement fully its own resolutions and to set a time-limit for their implementation.

27. The Government and the people of Poland follow with deep concern the situation in and around Namibia. We consider that South Africa's military buildup and the brutal acts of armed aggression against Angola and other neighbouring countries constitute a grave danger for peace in that region. The statement by the representative of South Africa at the 2481st meeting constituted yet more arrogant evidence that nothing has changed in its approach. One can easily identify the source of that arrogance, for it stems directly from the unlimited support the South African régime receives from certain quarters, which it can always count on, even if that is not so clearly demonstrated in this chamber.

28. We read with great interest the report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983). We took note of its conclusion that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., para. 25.*]

29. We flatly reject the policy of the so-called linkage. It is not and cannot be accepted. We share the views expressed by the representative of Ethiopia on behalf of the OAU, by the representative of Angola and by other speakers from the front-line and other States.

30. This is a crucial issue for the future implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Thus the Council cannot but take a clear-cut stand on it and confirm once again its unequivocal position.

31. We fully support the opinion that Council resolution 435 (1978), without any modification or qualification, is the only acceptable basis for a peaceful solution of the question of Namibia and that the independence of that Territory can be resolved only through a cessation of the illegal occupation. There should be no illusion that a negotiated settlement of the question of Namibia outside the consensus contained in resolution 435 (1978) and outside the framework of the United Nations is possible.

32. We share the opinion of many speakers that, in the event of South Africa's continued defiance of United Nations decisions, the Council should consider the imposition of appropriate measures as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Only decisive sanctions will produce the necessary results provided that they are universally and effectively implemented.

33. If the sanctions are not effective and if the United States and some other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continue to supply weapons and war equipment to the *apartheid* régime, there will be no other way for the people of Namibia and SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, but to continue to develop the liberation struggle by all means, including armed struggle, as a legitimate way to achieve freedom and national independence. In doing so, they will have the support of all of Africa and of all progressive forces in the world.

34. There is still a chance for a negotiated peaceful solution. It is not too late to achieve this goal through the implementation of United Nations resolutions. Poland will

support the decision of the Council aimed at achieving this objective.

35. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*Interpretation from Russian*): The Council is meeting once again, at the request of the Group of African States and the non-aligned countries, to consider the question of Namibia. We welcome the participation in the work of the Council of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Mr. Goshu Wolde, who, on behalf of the Chairman of the OAU, has most clearly and convincingly stated the point of view of the African countries regarding the most recent course of events in Namibia.

36. The Soviet delegation also welcomes the delegation of SWAPO and its participation in the work of the Council. SWAPO has headed the struggle of patriotic forces for the liberation of Namibia from domination by the South African racists. The statement made by the Secretary for Foreign Relations of that organization, Peter Mueshihange, attests to the firm decision of the Namibian people to wage this struggle until they have completely freed their homeland from colonial and racist oppression by South Africa.

37. We have also listened most attentively to the statement made by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the representative of Zambia, Mr. Paul Lusaka, under whose leadership the Council for Namibia is making an important contribution to the cause of defending the interests of the Namibian people.

38. The state of affairs regarding the implementation of Council decisions on the granting of independence to Namibia is a cause of legitimate concern to the African countries and the majority of the States Members of the United Nations. I would say that it is a cause of concern to the entire world community. Despite numerous Security Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions, the Pretoria régime stubbornly persists in its refusal to cease its occupation of Namibia and to give its people their freedom. Moreover, year after year, the racists of South Africa continue to aggravate the situation throughout southern Africa, to extend military actions from the Territory of Namibia to Angola and wage an undeclared and continuing war against Angola, and to perpetrate constant acts of armed aggression against other African countries.

39. The recent piratical raid by South Africans against Mozambique is yet one more link in a long chain of crimes committed by the racist régime against independent Africa. Speaking here on 21 October [*2482nd meeting, para. 83*], the representative of Mozambique stated that it was not only the right but also the duty of his Government to take all necessary measures to preserve Mozambique's national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. He expressed the view that the members of the Council should take note of that statement. I assure the representative of Mozambique that his statement did not pass unnoticed.

40. The racists are making a serious mistake if they are banking on the fact that history and the peoples of Africa will forgive them for this blanket use of arbitrary will towards their neighbours. It is now perfectly clear to everyone that the Pretoria régime is not merely an outpost of colonialism and racism in southern Africa but also the source of an ever-greater danger to international peace and security.

41. Seventeen years have already passed since the moment when the General Assembly demanded that South Africa unconditionally—I stress "unconditionally"—free Namibia. During these long years—long, above all, for the long-suffering people of Namibia—South Africa, relying on support from the United States and several other NATO countries, but mainly from the United States, has done all in its power to block the process of decolonization for Namibia. One has to be incredibly naive to believe seriously the claim that Pretoria alone is able to resist the will of the entire world community and to act in such a provocative and aggressive manner towards other African countries from a position of strength, an attitude we observed here last week in the Council during the statement of the South African representative. The representative of South Africa was very frank in dotting all his i's. He reaffirmed his position in favour of that notorious linkage, challenged the Council, and rejected in advance any possible decisions that would set a timetable for the implementation of a solution to the Namibian conflict.

42. Behind the arrogance of the racist régime is the powerful support of its friends and allies—who are as much the enemies of national liberation movements in Africa and throughout the world as are the South African racists.

43. During the process of sabotaging a settlement of the question of Namibia, which has gone on for many years now, the opponents of Namibian independence have a definite distribution of roles: Pretoria refuses to implement United Nations decisions and is waging an undeclared war against its neighbours, while the United States and several other Western Powers do not allow the adoption against South Africa of effective sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and try to gain time by asserting that they will be able to persuade the Pretoria régime to grant independence to Namibia through peaceful means.

44. For all these 17 years, the African countries and the entire world have heard optimistic and endless variations by the United States and other Western Powers on the theme that the goal is already in sight, that the Africans need to be more patient, make yet a few more concessions to Pretoria, remove a few more obstacles in the path of a settlement of the problem of Namibia with South Africa. Only the day before yesterday the Council once again heard the honeyed assurances that the United States is rendering assistance to the parties in implementing resolution 435 (1978) and eliminating obstacles to its implementation; we also heard appeals to show good will and redouble efforts, and so forth. Are we really going to be listening to those statements for another 17 years? It is clear that all the promises and forced optimism are nothing but a smoke-screen, just an attempt to deceive, with the aim of delaying for entire decades the granting of independence to Namibia.

45. Moreover, the Western Powers do not want to hear anything about the application of any sanctions whatever against South Africa—although in recent times sanctions have become a popular measure in United States foreign policy. The present United States Administration is ready to threaten anyone with sanctions, even certain members of the Council, if they do not vote as Washington wishes. The proper term for that is blackmail. But any compulsory measures to be applied against Pretoria only have to be mentioned to be immediately subjected to a taboo.

46. In refusing to grant independence to Namibia and stepping up military pressure on independent States of southern Africa, Pretoria and Washington are trying to hide their anti-African policy with fabrications to the effect that the conflict around Namibia represents a confrontation between the East and the West. This is a propaganda screen and nothing more, intended to create an excuse for interference by the United States in the affairs of that region and ensure its strategic interests there, to the detriment of the national interests of the African countries. In fact the problem of Namibia represents a conflict between South Africa and the United States and the Western Powers of NATO which support them, on the one hand, and the people of Namibia and of independent African countries, on the other. It is a conflict between the national liberation movement of southern Africa and the united forces of imperialism and racism.

47. If during the first stages of this dubious game with Namibia the Western Powers, hiding behind the role of intermediaries, still referred to the uncompromising nature of South Africa, in recent times Washington has ripped off that mask and is right now itself trying to achieve a link between the settlement of the Namibian question and the unrelated question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which are there at the request of the Angolan Government under an agreement between Angola and Cuba.

48. This illegal demand of Washington and Pretoria has obvious objectives in mind, namely, to block the settlement of the Namibian question, to weaken Angola through military threats made by the South African aggressors and to limit the sovereign rights of Angola, including its inalienable right to self-defence, a right guaranteed to it under Article 51 of the Charter.

49. The representatives of African countries who have spoken in the Council have rightly revealed the true motives and the underlying reasons of this policy of the United States, which has made Namibia hostage to its imperialist ambitions on the African continent. They condemned and rejected any and all attempts by South Africa and the United States to link, in direct form or within the context of so-called parallelism, the independence of Namibia with any other unrelated questions whatever and, *inter alia*, with the question of the presence of Cuban internationalists in Angola.

50. This position is supported by the overwhelming majority of the States of the world. It has been reflected in decisions of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983 [*see S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I*], and also in decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and in the statement of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, which took place here at United Nations Headquarters at the beginning of this month [*see S/16035, annex*].

51. Now this position of the world community must be clearly and unambiguously reflected in a decision of the Security Council, which this time also is obliged to make its authoritative voice heard so as to arrive at a speedy and unconditional decolonization of Namibia.

52. Our delegation believes that the proposal of the African countries, too, is correct regarding the establishment in a decision by the Council of a strict time-frame for starting implementation of a settlement of the Namibian question.

53. These provisions will be a useful addition to the well-known position of the United Nations regarding a settlement in Namibia which is determined by decisions taken on Namibia as a whole. It is precisely in these decisions of the United Nations, above all in Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), that we have the political basis for a just settlement of the Namibian problem.

54. The adoption by the Council in May of this year of resolution 532 (1983) was yet another step in the right direction, and this resolution, and in particular the mandate given in it to the Secretary-General, created specific machinery to move forward a settlement of the Namibian question.

55. The present consideration by the Council of the question of Namibia is called on to strengthen and continue this positive process. It is necessary in the future, as well, to strengthen the role of the United Nations in settling the Namibian question by providing for effective control by the Council over implementation of all aspects of granting Namibia genuine independence, including, of course, the questions of the training, composition, leadership, deployment and activities of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.

56. In speaking of all these matters, we cannot, however, rid ourselves of the impression that, as far as a settlement of the Namibian problem is concerned, the Council is beginning to go round in a circle or, more precisely, it has been led into that position by some of the Western Powers. To enable the Council to escape from this circle, South Africa must be forced to take into account the will of the Council through the adoption of compulsory measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, and for these purposes it is necessary to overcome the resistance of those Western Powers permanent members of the Council which are blocking this and defending the racist régime from any kind of effective international sanctions. It is not easy to do this, but it must be done in the interest of liberating Namibia and of preserving international peace.

57. The Soviet Union supports the demands of the African countries regarding the adoption by the Council of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, to force the régime of Pretoria to cease its illegal occupation of Namibia and to halt acts of aggression by the racists against African States.

58. Our country favours the speedy realization by the Namibian people of its inalienable right to self-determination and independence, on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands, and the immediate and complete withdrawal from Namibia of the troops and administration of South Africa.

59. The Soviet Union has rendered and will continue to render support in the just struggle of the people of Namibia under the leadership of its sole and authentic representative, SWAPO.

60. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): In May of this year, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 532 (1983) on the question of Namibia, which, among other things, authorized the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire—South Africa and SWAPO—with a view to securing the speedy implementation of the United Nations independence plan for Namibia approved by resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary-General's report is now before the Council [*S/15943*]. Once again it falls to us, members of the Council, to assess the situation as outlined in the report and, conscious of our special and unique responsibility for Namibia and the aspirations for peace, justice and independence harboured by its people, to decide on the action to be taken in the light of the Secretary-General's findings.

61. The Namibian problem has been before the United Nations virtually since the inception of the Organization. In fact, Namibia has been an acknowledged international responsibility for more than 60 years, first as a mandated Territory of the League of Nations, then as a Territory under the lawful administration of the United Nations. In 1966, the General Assembly revoked South Africa's Mandate and placed Namibia under the direct responsibility of the United Nations [*resolution 2145 (XXI)*], an action that was consequently confirmed and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 245 (1968) and by the International Court of Justice.[1] Yet South Africa simply ignored the verdict of these three United Nations bodies and continued its illegal occupation of the Territory in defiance of the international community and world opinion.

62. It is a source of deep regret and anger to my Government that, while the Namibian people continue their interminable wait for independence, negotiations that should lead to an internationally acceptable solution in accordance with resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) seem to be endlessly protracted. Now, as in May, my Government feels justified in questioning South Africa's readiness to co-operate in good faith with the United Nations in enabling the people of Namibia freely to determine their own future and granting them their long overdue independence. What is needed now is a firm expression by South Africa of its willingness to carry out the Council's resolutions, without any further pre-conditions, as concrete proof of its good intentions.

63. Only such an assurance, followed by practical steps towards a solution, could remove the widespread suspicion that South Africa is merely playing for time.

64. We owe the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, a heartfelt tribute for the highly skilful way in which they try to carry out the difficult mandate conferred on them. The Secretary-General's latest report bears eloquent testimony to his constant and intense personal involvement in the quest for a settlement and to the prominent place the question of Namibia rightly occupies in his order of priorities. Feeling that he should leave no stone unturned where the right of Namibia's people to independence is concerned, the Secretary-General this summer decided, after careful consideration, to pay a short working visit to South Africa to discuss the two remaining issues: the choice of an electoral system and a few points pertaining to UNTAG. As his consultations with the South African Government resulted in agreement on these two outstanding issues, the Secretary-General rightly concluded in his report that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*S/15943, para. 24.*]

65. As we all know, the latest delay in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) was not caused by any fundamental disagreement on the details of the settlement plan. In the summer of 1982, as the consultations between the parties were nearing their completion, South Africa raised a new obstacle by making its final approval conditional on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Organization thus faces a grave dilemma. As the Secretary-General pointed out to the South African side, the so-called linkage issue falls outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978). We fully share this view. It is clearly unacceptable that the early exercise by the Namibian people of their internationally recognized and inalienable right to self-determination and independence should be impeded because of the situation in a neighbouring country. This would be incompatible with the legal responsibility of the United Nations towards Namibia and with the general recognition that the independence of Namibia is the essential and primary issue, which must necessarily take precedence over other considerations. Yet, on the other hand, none of us would wish to jeopardize the substantial progress which has so far been achieved, thanks to the tenacious work of the many parties involved, by allowing the process to be side-tracked, or even derailed, because of extraneous aspects.

66. My Government feels that once an independent Namibia has taken its rightful place among the free nations of Africa and the threat of South African aggression against Angola has disappeared, the withdrawal of foreign troops from that State would increase regional security. Indeed, there seems some merit in the view that the parties concerned might wish to attain a common understanding on

this and other issues relevant to the stability of the region as a whole in the situation prevailing after Namibia's attainment of independence. I repeat, however, that these issues should not deflect us from our primary responsibility—that is, to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination without further delay.

67. The Secretary-General pointed out in his report that we cannot claim real progress until an actual date is fixed for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and the cease-fire comes into force. And, sounding a grave warning, he added that "further disastrous consequences will result if we do not reach this stage quickly." [*Ibid., para. 28.*]

68. My Government fully subscribes to the Secretary-General's assessment of the calamitous situation that will engulf the entire area if the present stalemate is allowed to persist. In our view there can be no doubt that South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia is part of a situation which seriously threatens international peace and security. How seriously this threat must be taken is vividly illustrated by South Africa's constant military incursions into Angola and the attempts at destabilization and intimidation that have come to characterize South Africa's relations with its neighbours. We strongly condemn these acts of aggression, which are obviously meant to punish these countries for their steadfast opposition to South African *apartheid* policies and their insistence that South Africa comply with the Council resolutions on Namibia.

69. It is imperative, therefore, that South Africa be called upon to desist from attacking its neighbours and to agree to a cease-fire as a first, urgent step to improve the security of all nations in the region. This might in its turn contribute to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to a breakthrough in the present impasse. Modest as such a step may seem against the background of the long and frustrating delays that occurred in past years, it nevertheless might be helpful in getting things moving again in the right direction. Failing this, the Council is duty-bound to consider appropriate means of applying further pressure to South Africa to comply with the Council's previous resolutions.

70. Clearly, the prestige of the United Nations is at stake. In view of the United Nations' special responsibility for Namibia and its long history of involvement in efforts to enable its people freely to exercise their right to self-determination, a smooth transfer of power in Windhoek under the aegis of the United Nations would be an important boost for the Organization and a victory for international co-operation. If the lost impetus is restored and meaningful negotiations are resumed by building on the solid foundations already laid, this will undoubtedly enhance the credibility of the United Nations and redound to its effectiveness in dealing with other areas. Perhaps it is not yet too late, but if we wish to avoid being overtaken by events that could undo what progress has been made over the past years we should join hands now in concerted, decisive action. Only this will convince the Namibian people and the world community that the Council is united in its commitment to the establishment of an independent Namibia at the earliest possible date and in its determination to overcome the remaining obstacles standing in the way of the attainment of this goal.

71. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

72. Mr. PELLETIER (Canada): Mr. President, I am most grateful to you and to the Council for again giving my country an opportunity to participate in this debate. The situation in Namibia is of concern to us all, not least to those of us in the front-line States and the contact group that have worked to change it. The situation affects the people of Namibia, who have an unquestioned right to freedom and self-determination. It affects the countries of Africa, which have worked hard for Namibia's independence. Further delay is in no one's interest. I am confident, Mr. President, that, with your experience and understanding, you will lead the Council towards a positive result that hastens the day when Namibia will be free.

73. The members of the contact group have consistently supported applications from persons competent for the purpose who have requested the opportunity to speak at Council meetings concerning the situation in Namibia, in order to supply the Council with information on this question in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Contact group members have done so without passing any judgement on the opinions expressed by those persons. They consider it important that the Council, which by its previous decisions has engaged itself to seek the holding of free and fair elections in Namibia, should provide, on an impartial basis, opportunities to those who may be parties to those elections to present their views. In this context, the members of the contact group are transmitting messages from two internal parties.

74. Canada helped to initiate and to frame the United Nations settlement plan for Namibia in 1978. My Government deeply regrets that the Council is still seized of this issue five years later. The people of Namibia are still unable to exercise their right to self-determination. We understand and share the concerns of the international community which have prompted the call for the Council to meet.

75. The road to the peaceful independence of Namibia has not been straight or smooth. We have found many pot-holes and some major road-blocks. Occasionally the road has seemed to wind backwards. Sometimes we have feared that the road might end short of Namibia's independence, but we have made progress. It is in this context that I should like to join other speakers in complimenting the Secretary-General on his recent efforts to restore momentum towards the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978).

76. By its resolution 532 (1983), the Council mandated the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). His subsequent efforts, as outlined in his report [*S/15943*], reflect more than just one visit to southern

Africa. They reflect a continuing commitment on the part of the Secretary-General and his staff to this just cause.

77. In his report, the Secretary-General has outlined his discussions both before and during his visit to southern Africa. These discussions demonstrated the Secretary-General's commitment to carry out faithfully and conscientiously the mandate entrusted to him by the Council last May.

78. We welcome the assurances from the Government of South Africa that the choice of electoral system, whether proportional representation or the constituency system, would be made and would be communicated at an early stage in the implementation process. That is essential to the success of the United Nations plan. We are glad that agreement has been reached on the proposed composition of UNTAG and that the remaining questions regarding its status have been settled. We believe, in addition, that the Secretary-General's assurances that all parties would be treated equally in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have effectively resolved this matter. We also note the positive statement that the President of SWAPO made to the Secretary-General. We welcome the co-operation of all parties involved in these discussions and these important steps forward.

79. Now that the outstanding issues under resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, the question is: Where do we go from here? My Government hopes that the Secretary-General will have the opportunity to build constructively on his recent success. We believe that he should be free to use all the means at his disposal to pursue early independence for Namibia and thereby to foster peace and stability in southern Africa. To this end, we would strongly urge that unrealistic deadlines be avoided while seeking implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in 1984.

80. The question of peace and stability in the region is important. My Government fully shares the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General in his report. The instability and conflict arising from South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia have had disastrous consequences for Namibia and its neighbours. Measures to build confidence and to reduce conflict in the region are urgently needed. We would support initiatives to that end for, as the Secretary-General has said, "it is in the interest of absolutely no one to have this situation continue." [*Ibid., para. 27.*]

81. It is important that the Government of South Africa recognize this basic fact. Just days before this debate, South African troops again violated the sovereignty of Mozambique. We condemn that attack in Maputo. We also condemn acts of violence or terrorism wherever they may occur.

82. South Africa cannot seek, through its use of force, unilaterally to reshape the region. Boundaries and sovereignties must remain inviolate. That is the only basis for peace in the region. The President of Angola has reaffirmed that his country has no desire to rely on foreign troops or to keep them on its soil once Angola is no longer threatened. The first step toward a settlement must surely be the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. Their presence there cannot be justified in terms of international law and practice.

83. The Secretary-General has noted that South Africa continues to make the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola a condition for its withdrawal from Namibia. South Africa cannot, however, legitimize its illegal occupation of Namibia by raising other issues. As the Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs stated in his speech to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, Namibia should have its independence regardless of what happens or does not happen in Angola.[2]

84. Canada admires the patience of those leaders in the region who have worked so hard for so long for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We take their patience and their dogged persistence as our own example. We shall not cease our efforts. The implementation of resolution 435 (1978) during 1984 must be our objective and that of the Council.

85. We have come a long way since 1978. Unfortunately, we still have some distance to go. I hope that the Council's deliberations will lead to practical steps to strengthen confidence in the region and hasten Namibia's independence. Its independence is no dream; it is inevitable reality. Our goal must be to ensure that this independence comes soon and peacefully.

86. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Argentina. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

87. Mr. MUÑIZ (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, Mr. President, my delegation wishes to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October, since you represent a country with which Argentina has very cordial relations. We are convinced that the Council will be able to accomplish fruitful work on the question of Namibia under your leadership, thanks to your acknowledged experience and reputation. We should like to express our delegation's readiness to co-operate with you in every way.

88. The Council is once again considering the question of Namibia, the rapid, just and final solution of which, through the authentic exercise of the right to self-determination and independence of the Namibian people, is called for by the overwhelming majority of the international community.

89. A short time ago, the Council adopted resolution 532 (1983), which called upon South Africa to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to comply with Council resolution 435 (1978); the resolution further called upon the Pretoria Government to co-operate forthwith and fully with the Secretary-General in order to expedite the imple-

mentation of resolution 435 (1978) for the early independence of Namibia.

90. These provisions of resolution 532 (1983) reflect a virtually universal consensus that this manifestation of anachronistic and unjust colonialism in southern Africa must disappear once and for all. International justice, peace and security must be established in that part of the world and, in particular, in Namibia.

91. Argentina, associating itself with the opinion of the large majority of Members of the Organization, has pointed out that the independence of Namibia, with full enjoyment of territorial integrity and an authentically representative Government, will be the fundamental contribution to that much-desired peace and development in southern Africa.

92. The Secretary-General, who has made very valuable efforts towards the implementation of Council resolutions 435 (1978), 439 (1978) and 532 (1983), clearly pointed out in his report that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*Ibid., para. 24.*]

93. Argentina, in view of the situation I have just described, wishes to reaffirm its traditional position and to point out that the establishment of Namibia as a sovereign and completely independent State will only be possible on the following bases: first, Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), which form the legitimate framework for a peaceful transition to the independence of Namibia; secondly, full respect for the territorial integrity of Namibia, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands, in accordance with Security Council resolution 432 (1978) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly; thirdly, the rejection of any link or condition imposed by South Africa and not contained in resolution 435 (1978); fourthly, support for the action of the front-line States and SWAPO; and fifthly, cessation by South Africa of its policies of intimidation, aggression and illegal military occupation carried out against the neighbouring States, in particular, against Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho.

94. As was pointed out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of my country in a statement before the General Assembly on 26 September 1983, Argentina fully agrees with the Secretary-General that no real progress can be made until a precise date is set for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and a cease-fire enters into force.[3]

95. Therefore, my delegation is convinced that the Council should assume its primary responsibility concerning the prompt implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and, if necessary, apply all relevant measures, including those contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, so that the genuine and complete independence of Namibia may be attained as soon as possible.

96. Colonialism and any other form of foreign domination affecting international justice and dignity must be eliminated without further delay. It is for this reason that Argentina pledges its support for all the efforts of the Organization to ensure that the Namibian people may promptly enjoy their well-deserved freedom and justice.

97. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is Mr. Johnstone F. Makatini, representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

98. Mr. MAKATINI: Mr. President, I wish to thank you most sincerely for giving us the opportunity to participate in this Council meeting. Our thanks also go to all the members of this body for making this possible. Like many representatives who have preceded us, we are pleased to see you preside over the Council when it examines once again the problem to which the African people and justice-loving people as a whole attach so much importance. Your country's commitment to the international fight for freedom, justice and peace in the Middle East and southern Africa is well known, as is your own personal devotion to these just causes. This double qualification and your rich diplomatic experience inspire us with confidence that, under your able guidance, the deliberations of the Council will be crowned with success.

99. May I also, in the name of the National Executive Committee of ANC, pay tribute to my friend, brother and comrade, Mr. Noel Sinclair, for what everybody agrees was the outstanding leadership he provided to the Council during the difficult month of September. The role played by Guyana and a host of other countries that provide international front-line support in the fight against the inhuman system of *apartheid* is a source of tremendous inspiration and encouragement to our people.

100. Having failed to secure the intended annexation and incorporation of Namibia as a fifth province of South Africa and contesting the legal authority of the United Nations on this question, the Pretoria régime defiantly imposed its illegal occupation of this African territory some decades ago. This was followed by countless resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice and other international institutions, condemning racist South Africa's illegal occupation and calling for its termination. The international community also went further and recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

101. The Pretoria régime's response to this consensus was continued defiance, thereby forcing SWAPO to resort to armed struggle. In 1977, at a time when the development of the armed liberation struggle waged by the heroic people of Namibia, under their sole and authentic representative, SWAPO, had reached a high point, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany came forward and offered their services as a contact group which would use its collective diplomatic and economic leverage to coerce racist South Africa to co-operate towards a negotiated settlement of the

Namibian problem. SWAPO, together with the front-line States and Nigeria, were to become participants in this exercise.

102. That SWAPO, the front-line States and Nigeria were suspicious is common knowledge. For our part, we of ANC fully shared this suspicion. The cause of this strong suspicion was mainly the fact that all the members of the proposed contact group were countries that had done everything possible, short of direct military intervention in support of the *apartheid* régime, to thwart the Namibian people's liberation struggle.

103. What had brought about this change of heart? many asked. Was it the development of the struggle, led by SWAPO, which was progressively making the Namibian war of liberation unstoppable, as the ANC struggle intensified in South Africa itself? What was the group's hidden agenda? others asked. Was it the derailment of this liberation struggle and the imposition of a neo-colonialist solution in Namibia?

104. More questions came up. Was this initiative intended to help the Pretoria régime buy the time it needed to set up and consolidate a third-force group in preparation for a solution of its choosing—that is, the exclusion of SWAPO and the imposition of a puppet neo-colonialist régime in Namibia? Were these negotiations to be held with the illegal occupier of Namibia simply intended to put an end to the confrontational posture that had been taken by the international community against racist South Africa and to help rehabilitate that régime—a régime that stood universally condemned for its practice of the inhuman system of *apartheid*?

105. These questions have become pertinent in the face of not only the failure of the contact group to deliver what it promised but also the attitude, pronouncements and acts of solidarity displayed by the United States, the leader of the group, towards the *apartheid* régime.

106. We are convinced that the Pretoria régime is bent on perpetuating its illegal occupation of Namibia or imposing its own solution, in keeping with its determination to prevent the completion of the process through which neighbouring countries became independent and ceased to serve as buffer zones. Its policy of destabilization and aggression against the front-line States and Lesotho is in fact further proof of its intention to reverse this situation, which had resulted in the independence of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola and extended the frontiers of freedom to this last bastion of reaction on the African continent.

107. The propaganda campaign which accompanied the emergence of the Western contact group and the big promises that diplomatic and economic leverage would be collectively exerted on the Pretoria régime in order to force its hand tell the rest of the story.

108. A campaign was unleashed not only criticizing the countries that had always supported SWAPO and other liberation movements as interfering, but also claiming that the United States and other contact group members considered the mineral resources with which Namibia and South Africa itself were endowed to be of vital strategic interest to the United States. Although we remain convinced that the motive for setting up the contact group in 1977 was the determination to obstruct the outright victory that had become imminent in Zimbabwe and inevitable in Namibia, it is true that there were some positive elements. For example, we welcomed what we thought was the beginning of some movement towards recognizing the fact that the liberation struggle in southern Africa was indigenous and not an extension of East-West rivalry.

109. But the change in Washington and the assumption of leadership by the present Administration have resulted in the cancellation of the limited positive elements and the multiplication of the negative elements. While professing its commitment to the liberation of Namibia, the Reagan Administration has shamelessly proclaimed friendship and alliance with the racist oppressor, to which it has offered nuclear, dollar and other types of carrots, and has pledged to reward countries that befriend their racist ally and punish or topple those that give assistance to SWAPO and ANC.

110. This Pretoria-Washington unholy alliance has encouraged the *apartheid* régime's intransigence, repression, terrorism, destabilization and aggression in Namibia and South Africa and against the front-line States and Lesotho.

111. The linkage issue introduced by the United States is the most flagrant act of hostility against the liberation cause of Africa and the international community. Unfolding events have in fact shown that it is but the starting-point of a long chain of other so-called linkages intended to impede the liberation of southern Africa and strengthen the political, economic and military position of the Pretoria régime as the bastion, gendarme and strategic ally in the region of the United States of the Reagan Administration. Part of this strategy has taken the form of economic blackmail and the use of armed bandits, who serve as the extension of the régime's racist army in carrying out acts of destabilization and aggression against neighbouring States.

112. As a result, we find that the posture adopted by the *apartheid* régime with regard to the independent African States of southern Africa is governed today by the promotion of what Pretoria describes as its policy of national security. Indeed, this policy constitutes the centre-piece of Pretoria's strategy for the defence and entrenchment of the *apartheid* system.

113. In accordance with this policy, the régime seeks to destroy SWAPO and ANC in Namibia and South Africa, and it has examples to learn from as it continues its activities in the direction of a Beirut-type operation in southern Africa.

114. The second component of this strategy is the transformation of the rest of the region into a so-called constellation of client States under its domination. Again the central element of the strategy is the liquidation of

SWAPO and ANC even outside the borders of the respective countries, or at least our eviction from the region. In pursuance of this strategy, the Pretoria régime is bent on a campaign of terror, aggression and destabilization which we are convinced will only stop when the Council takes effective action or when the régime feels it has pacified the whole region.

115. This position of the Washington Administration is taken, for example, by the United States Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, who stated that the efforts to secure a negotiated settlement in Namibia must also address racist South Africa's so-called legitimate security concerns. This, we submit, is a creeping move towards campaigning for the liquidation of ANC in the region, as yet another linkage.

116. The statement of the United States representative before the Council at the 2484th meeting, on 24 October, is yet another example. And so is the statement of the Pretoria régime's representative, at the 2481st meeting, to whom the simple discovery of a pamphlet during its unprovoked aggression in Maputo, a pamphlet that talks of ANC soldiers, justifies the régime's aggression against the capital of Mozambique.

117. Perhaps the most central part of the Reagan Administration's policy and strategy of so-called constructive engagement is helping to placate world public opinion and giving credibility to racist South Africa in its pretence of engaging in peaceful talks, thus helping that régime to buy time and prepare for the imposition of a neo-colonialist settlement in Namibia. Evidence on the ground also shows that part of this strategy is not only the destabilization of the front-line States but also the toppling of their legitimate Governments. We seize this opportunity to pay a tribute to those countries for the sacrifice they are making in resisting the combined pressure of the United States and racist South Africa, designed to force them to enter into secret agreements for the liquidation of ANC and the liberation struggle in South Africa.

118. It is clear that an honest examination of the situation can only lead to the following conclusions.

119. The negotiated settlement has never been, and is not today, around the corner, as some have been saying for a number of years now. There has been no substantial progress in that direction, and none can be made in the face of the anti-African-liberation position of the Pretoria régime and its Washington allies. Implementation of the United Nations plan can be achieved only through forcing racist South Africa to withdraw unconditionally from Namibia and not through persuasion. Continued delay by the Council in taking this position and imposing sanctions will not only erode the authority of the United Nations but make it an accomplice in the crimes yet to be committed by the *apartheid* régime. We therefore call for the immediate imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria régime and appeal to the other members of the contact group to condemn the issue of linkage and publicly to dissociate themselves from that position.

120. In conclusion I wish to pay a glowing tribute to the valiant people of Namibia, whose patience, perseverance and fortitude, combined with the yet unsung political maturity acquired in the course of the bitter struggle they have been waging for so long under the far-sighted leadership of their sole and authentic representative, SWAPO, has enabled them to defeat the countless machinations and manoeuvres designed to derail their heroic struggle and pave the way for a new colonialist solution.

121. Through Comrade Peter Mueshihange, through the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and the SWAPO Central Committee, headed by the indomitable Comrade Sam Nujoma, we salute our comrades-in-arms, the people of Namibia, for the important victories they continue to win in both the political and the military fields.

122. We dip our banner in memory of those who have fallen in battle or as victims of massacres and assassinations perpetrated by the Pretoria régime while we are being told in the Council that our frustrations are shared by the mighty ones.

123. We salute the SWAPO leadership, and pledge to reciprocate the support the Namibian people have always given our struggle by intensifying ours in the belly of the *apartheid* beast, thereby complementing yours and bringing closer our inevitable common victories.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

[2] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 8th meeting, para. 42.

[3] *Ibid.*, 6th meeting, para. 77.

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